CCR Condo Losses 2026: Is Prime Property Worth Buying?

Singapore property is supposed to only go up, and for most of the island that has been close enough to true to feel like fact. But walk into the resale market for Core Central Region condos in 2025 and 2026 and you find sellers booking losses, some running past $1 million, at addresses that were meant to be the most resilient in the country.

Short answer: CCR condos returned roughly 18% over 15 years against about 45% for OCR, and several named Core Central Region projects are still posting resale losses, some over $1 million. The underperformance is structural: a smaller foreign buyer pool, ageing leases and a quantum mismatch against new OCR supply. Selective CCR entry in 2026 can still make sense, mainly for long-term owner-occupiers rather than capital-growth investors.

What does the 15-year price data actually show?

CCR condos have delivered the weakest price growth of any region over the past 10 to 15 years, regardless of how prestigious the address. According to Knight Frank and SRX data, CCR prices rose about 21% over 10 years (2012–2022) and roughly 18% over 15 years (2010–2025), against 39%/45% for OCR and 35%/55% for RCR over the same windows. Annualised, that works out to roughly 1.1% a year for CCR versus 2.5–3% for OCR and 3–3.5% for RCR.

Region	10-yr growth (2012–2022)	15-yr growth (2010–2025)	Approx. annualised
CCR	21%	18%	~1.1% p.a.
RCR	35%	55%	~3–3.5% p.a.
OCR	39%	45%	~2.5–3% p.a.

In my view, this is the number that matters most for anyone evaluating CCR: as an illustration, a buyer who entered a CCR project in 2010 at $2,500 psf and held 15 years might now be around $2,950 psf, an 18% nominal gain before stamp duty, mortgage interest and maintenance. A comparable OCR buyer at $900 psf in 2010 could now be near $1,300 psf, a 44% gain on a much lower capital base. Note that CCR did post the strongest year-on-year growth of the three regions in Q3 2025, at 8.28%, but that was driven largely by new launches and does not yet change the structural picture for older resale stock.

Which named CCR projects are recording losses, and why?

EdgeProp's reporting on individual transactions gives the clearest picture. At The Clift (District 1, TOP 2011), the average price peaked at $2,373 psf in 2012 and had fallen 29.2% to $1,677 psf by March 2026. In that month, a 775 sq ft unit sold for $1.3 million against a 2011 purchase price of $2.116 million, a loss of $815,769 after 15 years; 85 of 346 recorded transactions there have been unprofitable, with a record loss of $965,600. At Marina Bay Suites, all five resale transactions in 2025 were unprofitable, with the highest loss at $2.057 million; average price has fallen 19.9% from its 2018 peak of $2,838 psf to below $2,000 psf. At OUE Twin Peaks, 19 of 20 resale transactions in 2025 were unprofitable, with a top loss of $1.002 million and a 15.3% average decline from 2016 to 2025. Marina One Residences was the most prolific loss-maker by volume in 2025, also down 19.9% from its 2018 peak, with one loss near $1.155 million.

Project	Peak psf	Current psf (approx.)	Decline	Notable loss
The Clift	$2,373 (2012)	$1,677 (Mar 2026)	-29.2%	$815,769 / record $965,600
Marina Bay Suites	$2,838 (2018)	<$2,000	-19.9%	$2.057 million
OUE Twin Peaks	$2,919	$2,242	-15.3%	$1.002 million
Marina One Residences	2018 peak	-19.9% from peak	-19.9%	approx. $1.155 million

None of these are poorly located or poorly built projects. What they share is a buyer profile that has not been replaced: all were bought near 2011–2015 price peaks by a largely foreign or investor pool that was progressively taxed out of the market, culminating in the 60% Additional Buyer's Stamp Duty introduced in 2023. The replacement buyer is a local household that prioritises school proximity and space per dollar over CBD prestige, and many older CCR units were not built for that buyer.

Why does CCR structurally underperform OCR and RCR?

Five mechanics explain most of the gap. First, the foreign buyer pool that once anchored CCR demand has shrunk sharply since the 2023 ABSD hike. Second, decentralisation of employment to hubs like Jurong Lake District and Punggol Digital District has narrowed the commute premium that CCR addresses used to command. Third, on a pure quantum basis an older CCR two-bedroom at $2,200 psf in 700 sq ft costs $1.54 million, while a new-launch OCR three-bedroom at the same psf in 1,000 sq ft costs $2.2 million for considerably more space and a fresh lease. Fourth, as leasehold CCR projects age, banks apply more conservative loan-to-value ratios, thinning the pool of financed buyers. Fifth, the 2023 ABSD increase on second properties (17% to 20% for citizens, 25% to 30% for PRs) hit the local investor segment that used to buy CCR pied-à-terres. By contrast, OCR and RCR demand is driven mainly by domestic upgraders and young families, a larger, more ABSD-insulated pool: OrangeTee, Savills and SRX data show OCR condos averaging roughly 39% gains from 2014–2025 and RCR around 26%, with OCR volumes running at roughly three times CCR's share of resale transactions in mid-2025. For the wider market picture, see why land bids keep rising while supply grows.

Will CCR recover, and what should buyers actually check?

There are genuine signs of life at the top of the market. New launches such as The Robertson Opus and UpperHouse at Orchard Boulevard are selling from roughly $2,750 psf upward with respectable take-up, and Knight Frank has noted that a narrowing price gap to OCR could create value opportunities for attentive buyers. But recovery will not be even. New CCR launches are priced for today's land and construction costs and should find buyers at the right quantum. Older resale projects bought at 2011–2015 peaks face a much steeper climb: at The Clift, closing the gap back to the 2011 entry price of roughly $2,730 psf would require average prices to rise about 63% from current levels, which is not a five-year story.

Before considering any CCR purchase in 2026, check three things: whether you are buying new-launch or resale and what domestic demand anchors (school, MRT) the project has; your realistic holding period against the remaining lease, since financing constraints tighten as leases shorten; and whether you are buying for lifestyle or for capital growth, because the 15-year data only supports one of those cases.

Who CCR suits, and who it may not

Worth considering: owner-occupiers genuinely working in the CBD with a 10-year-plus horizon; freehold buyers who value tenure for legacy planning; buyers targeting the established top of the market (Nassim, Ardmore, Cuscaden-type addresses) treating the purchase as capital preservation; and buyers entering new 2026 launches at developer pricing, where the premium over OCR has narrowed.

Probably not a fit: buyers targeting older leasehold CCR resale units hoping for a return to peak pricing, especially with under 80 years of lease left; investors expecting CCR to beat OCR on a 5–10 year horizon without a major shift in ABSD policy; and HDB upgraders whose main goal is maximising growth per dollar deployed, where OCR and selected RCR projects have the stronger historical case. Where financing or CPF usage is part of your decision, speak to a licensed financial adviser for advice specific to your situation.

The bottom line

The losses at The Clift, Marina Bay Suites, OUE Twin Peaks and Marina One Residences are not proof that prime property is a bad investment. They are proof that entry price, buyer-profile dependency and lease trajectory matter more than address prestige. The buyers who entered in 2011–2013 were not foolish; they bought into a genuine demand cycle that later reversed when its structural supports were removed by policy. The lesson for 2026 is to be clear about who your next buyer will be, at what price and under what financing conditions, before you commit. If you cannot describe that buyer, you are not investing, you are hoping.

Questions readers ask

Are all CCR condos losing money?

No. The named losses at The Clift, Marina Bay Suites, OUE Twin Peaks and Marina One Residences involve older leasehold projects bought near 2011–2015 price peaks. Newer CCR launches and established freehold addresses have performed differently, and 2025 new-launch take-up has been reasonably healthy.

Why has CCR underperformed OCR for so long?

Mainly because CCR demand depended heavily on foreign and investor buyers who were progressively taxed out of the market, while OCR demand comes from a larger, steadier pool of domestic upgraders. Lease decay and a weaker quantum-per-square-foot case for older CCR units add to the gap.

Is 2026 a good time to buy in the CCR?

It depends on your purpose. For owner-occupiers with a long horizon and a genuine lifestyle motivation, current entry pricing in some new launches looks more defensible than in past years. For buyers chasing capital growth to match OCR, the 15-year data does not currently support that expectation.

How does lease decay affect older CCR condos specifically?

As a 99-year leasehold project ages, banks apply more conservative loan-to-value limits, which shrinks the pool of financed buyers at resale. The Clift, now around 77 years from lease expiry, illustrates how this compounds with other demand weaknesses to suppress prices further.

Should I buy CCR for investment or lifestyle?

Be honest about which one applies. If it's genuine lifestyle motivation with a 10-year-plus hold, a well-selected freehold CCR property at 2026 entry pricing can be defensible. If it's purely investment return, the historical data favours OCR and RCR over CCR on that basis.

Sources

EdgeProp Singapore; Knight Frank; SRX Property Flash Report; Savills Singapore Residential Sales Briefing; OrangeTee.

This article is for informational and educational purposes only. It does not constitute financial, investment, or legal advice. Property investments involve risk. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Readers should seek independent advice from licensed professionals before making any property or financial decision. James Ong is a licensed real estate salesperson (CEA Reg No. R008385F) with PropNex Realty Pte Ltd and is not a licensed financial adviser.

James Ong | CEA Reg No. R008385F | PropNex Realty Pte Ltd